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1961] RECENT CASES
to which it has no vested right on condition that the prospective recipient
surrender a constitutional right.l a California previously enacted a law re-
quiring a loyalty oath as a prerequisite for obtaining a tax refund. This was
subsequently held unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court.1
4 It
is submitted that should a case of this nature arise in North Dakota, the
courts would follow the more liberal view espoused by the court in the in-
stant case and align themselves with what would appear to be the majority.
K. M. BROWN.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER - INSTALLMENT CONTRACT - WAVIER OF VENDOR'S
RIGHT TO TERMINATE INSTALLMENT PURCHASE CONTRACT THROUGH ACCEPT-
ANCE OF BELATED PAYMENTS. - Plaintiff signed an installment contract for the
purchase of an automobile which contained a non-waiver agreement. Plaintiff
failed to make payments on time and defendant repossessed the automobile.
Plaintiff brought an action against the finance company to recover installments
paid on the basis that defedant had entered into a "quasi new agreement"
with plaintiff under the Georgia statutes,1 by accepting belated payments.
Plaintiff was non-suited. On a appeal it was held, three judges dissenting,
the judgment reversed. The majority held the evidence established a prima
facie cause of action which would turn the question of wavier of contractual
rights to the jury. The dissent argued that the provision against waiver in
the contract should control the case and required affinnance of the judgment
of non-suit, in accordance with Georgia's public policy statute. 2 Few v. Auto-
mobile Finance, Inc., 115 S.E.2d 196 (Ga. App. 1960).
In the absence of automobile installment cases, the Georgia court referred
to a case involving belated payment of insurance premiums, in which the
jury considered whether the provision against waiver of contractual rights
had itself been waived. 3 The court departed from Georgia cases which held
that no departure from the terms of the contract is shown by a series of
installments which are paid belatedly. 4
The judgment is in general accord with decisions in other jurisdictions
13. Frost v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 593 (1926); Danskin v. San Diego
United School Dist., 28 Cal.2d 536, 171 F.2d 885 (1946); Lawson v. Housing Authority
of City 6f Milwaukee, 370 Wis. 269, 70 N.W.2d 605 (1955).
14. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) Justice Black concurring, "California, in
effect has imposed a tax on belief and expression. Li my view, a levy of this nature is
wholly out of place in this country."
1. Ga. Code Ann. § 20-116 (1935) "Where parties, in the course of the execution of a
contract, depart from its terms and pay or receive money under such departure, before
either can recover for failure to pursue the letter of the agreement, reasonable notice must
be given the other of intention to rely on the exact trenis of the 'agreement. Until such
notice, the departure is a quasi new agreement."
2. Ga. Cod Ann. § 102-106 (1935) "Laws made for the preservation of public order
or good morals cannot, be done away with or abrogated by any agreement; but a person
may waive or renounce what the law has established in his favor, when he does not
thereby injure others or affect the public interests."
3. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 54 Ga.App. 530, 188 S.E. 362 (1936).
4. Soverign Camp, W.O.W. v. Hart, 187 Ga. 123, 200 S.E. 296 (1938); Hill v. Sterehi
Bros. Stores, Inc., 50 Ga. 193, 177 S.E. 353 (1934) here the mere fact that defendant
paid some installments of membership in a fraternal benefit association after they were due
would not be sufficient to show departure as to require notice from plaintiff of intention to
comply with strict terms thereof before plaintiff could insist upon forfeiture of same.
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
dealing with land contracts5 and insurance premiums6 which hold that a
vendor who accepts default installment payments waives the contractual pro-
vision for payment on time. Acceptance of default payments, accompanied by
protest against default, will not waive the right to rescind.; Generally speak-
ing, after a condition of payment of installments on time has been eliminated
by a mere waiver, it can be re-established by giving a definite notice to the
debtor which specifies that installments must be paid as originally agreed. s
The larger portion of litigation concerning waiver of installment payments
appears in the context of insurance cases where the insurer who knowingly
accepts overdue premiums is deemed to waive prompt payment and is estop-
ped from forfeiting the policy.9 Any unequivocal act of an insurer indicating
an intention to waive a right is sufficient.10 Even a non-waiver agreement,
whether contained in the policy or existing separately, may be waived by acts
or conduct.i It appears forfeitures are not favored by the law, and the right
to forfeiture of an insurance policy for late payment of premiums will be
deemed waived if reasonably possible under the circumstances of the case. 1"
Georgia's stature on "quasi new agreements"' 3 appears to be somewhat
more definite than the comparable provisions of the North Dakota Code dealing
with waiver by a creditor after acceptance of default payments.1 4 North
Dakota has held that a policy condition prescribing forfeiture may be waived
by the insurer, as such waiver is regarded as being for the benefit of the
insurer. 1
5
Whether there has been a waiver in North Dakota nevertheless depends
upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case.1 6 With no case law
on point, it would seem probable that the degree of default in payment of in-
stallments would have to be somewhat greater in North Dakota than in
Georgia to establish a waiver in view of the difference in the language of
the statutes.
JAMES D. SCHLOSSER.
WILLS - CONSTRUCTION - EFFECT OF DEVISE "To A FOR LIFE AND THEN
TO His ISSuE." - The testator's will gave his son A an equitable life estate in
certain property and then provided that at A's death the property should pass
5. Laffon v. Collins, 212 Cal. 750, 300 Pac. 808 (1931); Porter v. Harrington, 262
Mass. 203, 159 N.E. 530 (1928); Sliwinski v. Gootstein, 234 Mich. 74, 208 N.W. 47
(1926); Bommelyn v. Moss, 121 N.J. Eq. 551, 197 Ati. 6 1938); Scott v. Molter, 119
S.W.2d 603 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).
6. Bruzas v. Peerless -Casualty Co., II1 Me. 308, 89 Atl. 199 (1913).
7. Beltinok v. Tacoma Theater Co., 61 Wash. 132, 111 Pac. 1045 (1910).
8. Mintle v. Sylvester, 202 Iowa 1128, 211 N.W. 367 (1926); Smith v. Carleton, 185
Ore. 672, 205 P.2d 160 (1949).
9. Floyd v. Life Casualty Ins. Co., 148 S.W.2d 620 (Mo.App. 1941); Home Bene-
ficial Ass'n v. Field, 162 Va. 63, 173 S.E. 370 (1934).
10. McDonald v. Equitable Life Assur. Society, 185 Iowa 1008, 169 N.W. 352 (1918);
Sjoberg v. State Auto Ins. Ass'n of Des Moines, 78 N.D. 179, 189, 48 N.W.2d 452, 457
(1951); Equitable Life Assur. Society v. Ellas, 185 Tr-x. 526, 147 S.W. 1152 (1912).
11. Marblestone v. Phoenix Assur. Co., 169 Minn. 1, 210 N.W. 385 (1926).
12. Page v. Washington Mut. Life Ass'n, 20 Cal.2d 234, 125 P.2d 20 (1942), Contra
Clifton v. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 168 N.C. 499, 84 S.E. 817 (1915).
13. See Note 1 supra.
14. N.D. Rev. Code § 9-1218 (1943) "The creditor must make objections to the mode
of an offer performance at the time it is made to him. If this is not done, any objection
which could have obviated at that time is waived by his failure to make the same."
15. Sioberg v. State Auto Ins. Ass'n of Des Moines, 78 N.D. 179, 48 N.W.2d 452
(1951).
16. Ibid.
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